Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Louise Mann v. Samuel P. Fredrickson, Riddle
Services, Inc., and Does 1 through 10 Inclusive :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Albert W. Gray; Smith and Glauser, P.C.; Attorney for all Appellees.
William R. Rawlings; Law Offices of William R. Rawlings; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mann v. Fredrickson, No. 20050955 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6095

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellaml,

Appellate Court Case No.
20050955 - CA

v.
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,
Defendants/Appeiiieos.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from a Jury Veitdict, and District Court Decision denying
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, in the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, State .of Utah, .the .Honorable Deno Himonas
presiding.
WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS, #6784
Law Offices of William R. Rawlings
11576 S. State St., #401
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 553-0505
Attorney for Appellant
ALBERT W. GRAY
Smith & Glauser, P.C.
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Attorney for all Appellees

Counsel for Appellant does request oral argument.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE r~.

-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appellate Court Case No.
20050955 - CA

v.
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from a Jury Verdict, and District Court Decision denying
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial, in the Third Judicial District, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas
presiding.
WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS, #6784
Law Offices of William R. Rawlings
11576 S. State St., #401
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801) 553-0505
Attorney for Appellant
ALBERT W. GRAY
Smith & Glauser, P.C.
7351 S. Union Park Ave., Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
Attorney for all Appellees

Counsel for Appellant does request oral argument.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

DISCUSSION

7

I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFHCIENT AND IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE JURY'S VERDICT
7
1. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's post-trial motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial
10
2. The trial court erred in relying on partial, remote and inconsistent facts
considered in isolation as the sole basis for upholding the verdict
14
H. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 WAS IMPROPERLY GIVEN, AS IT WAS
CONFUSING, MISLEADING AND NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE
18
CONCLUSION
Addenda
Addendum A - Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-62(1)
Addendum B - Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-69(2)
Addendum C - Final Order of Trial Court denying Motion for a New Trial

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. Sharp, 899P.2d 1245 (Utah App. 1995)
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136 (Utah 1982)

10
7
16

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988)

2

Holland v. Brown, 394P.2d77 (Utah 1964))

18

Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239

19

King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987)

11, 12

Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213 (Utah App. 1997)

16

Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 411 P.2d 132 (Utah 1966)

18

State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175 (Utah Ct.App. 1994)

3

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69(2) (2002)

3,9,13,20

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62(1) (2002)

3,11

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Louise Mann,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appellate Court Case No.
20050955 - CA

v.
SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the plaintiffs
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict due to insufficiency of the
evidence.
Standard of Review: An insufficiency of the evidence challenge to a denial
of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for a new trial
is governed by one standard of review: An appellate court will reverse only if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, it
concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Hansen v.
Stewart, 761 R2d 14 (Utah 1988).
Preservation: Appellant now appeals the decision of the trial court, which
denied the Appellant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the
conclusion of the trial.
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for a
new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence supporting the
apportionment of 100% of the liability to the Plaintiff.
Standard of Review: An insufficiency of the evidence challenge to a denial
of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a motion for a new trial
is governed by one standard of review: The appellate court will reverse only if,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed, it
concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Hansen v.
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).
Preservation: Appellant now appeals the decision of the trial court, denying
the Appellant's motion for a new trial, challenging the reasonableness of the
verdict apportioning 100% of the liability to the Plaintiff.
ISSUE III: Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for a
new trial on grounds that Jury Instruction No. 28 was improperly given, as it was
confusing, misleading and was not supported by sufficient evidence to serve as
defendants' theory of the case.
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court review's "the trial court's
determination concerning jury instructions for correctness, and accord[s] it no
particular deference." State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah Ct.App. 1994).
PRESERVATION: Appellant made a timely and sufficient objection to
Jury Instruction No. 28 at trial, and presented this issue to the trial court in her
motion for a new trial.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-69(2) (2002).
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-62(1) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises as a result of a motor vehicle accident occurring on or
about November 1, 2002, where a furniture truck being driven by Appellee
Fredrickson and owned by Appellee Riddle Services, Inc., struck Appellant's
vehicle from behind. Following the accident, Plaintiff/Appellant Louise Mann
filed a complaint against Samuel P. Fredrickson, Riddle Services, Inc., and Does 1
through 10 inclusive, alleging negligence and personal injuries.
On June 6, 2005, a jury trial commenced in this matter in the Third Judicial
District Court, before the Honorable Robert W. Adkins. At the conclusion of the
trial, on June 10, 2005, the jury returned a verdict finding the Plaintiff/Appellant
Louise Mann 100% at fault, and accordingly finding Defendants/Appellees
entirely free from any liability. Plaintiffs counsel moved for a judgment
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notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, which
the Trial Court denied.
After the trial on this matter, the Honorable Robert W. Adkins was
reassigned to a different court within the Third Judicial District, and the Honorable
Deno Himonas presided over the post-trial proceedings. Following the entering of
the judgment below, the Plaintiff/Appellant filed a timely motion for a new trial on
the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict and
improper jury instructions. Plaintiff/Appellant's motion was heard and decided by
the Honorable Deno Himonas, who denied the motion, relying on two partial
statements and inconsistent facts viewed in isolation as the sole support for His
ruling.
Following the denial of the motion for a new trial, the Plaintiff/Appellant
filed a timely notice for appeal and the matter was assigned to this Court.
Plaintiff/Appellant challenges the lower court's denial of her motions both for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on the basis that the
verdict was entirely inconsistent with the evidence and on grounds that the jury
was improperly instructed. The Appellant petitions this Court for relief, and
requests the Court to reverse the rulings of the district court and remand for a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial in this matter was a five-day proceeding with numerous medical
experts testifying with regard to injuries and the potential causation of said
4

injuries; these complex issues were not ultimately reached as the case was decided
on grounds of liability alone, 100% being assigned to the Appellant. The issues
before the Court on this appeal involve the determination of liability returned by
the jury. The following is a recitation of the facts relevant to liability.
The motor vehicle accident, which is the subject of this case, occurred on or
about November 1, 2002, in Salt Lake County, Utah, on Redwood Road at
approximately 9500 South in a construction zone. Partial Trial Transcript June 7,
8, & 9, 2005 ("Transcript I") at p. 17; Partial Trial Transcript June 9, 2005
("Transcript II") at p. 14.
According to the Appellant, Ms. Mann, the subject accident occurred while
she was driving through the construction zone on Redwood Road. Appellant
stated that she saw a flagger who instructed her to stop, so she stopped. Transcript
I at p. 18. Ms. Mann testified that she made a normal stop, and had stopped for ten
or fifteen seconds before Mr. Fredrickson's vehicle struck her from behind.
Transcript I at p. 19.
According to the Appellee, Mr. Fredrickson, the subject accident occurred
while both parties were driving through the construction zone on Redwood Road.
Mr. Fredrickson stated that he followed the Appellant's vehicle for a short time,
and she suddenly stopped in the middle of the road, and he didn't have enough
time to stop. Transcript II at p. 16. Appellee stated that although he tried to stop,
his truck started to fishtail, and he actually collided with the back of Appellant's
car at an angle. Id. Mr. Fredrickson stated that he saw no reason why the
5

Appellant would stop, but later acknowledged seeing a flagger standing
approximately 20 feet from the scene of the accident. Transcript II at pp. 17,19,
27.
Officer Matt Brown, the responding officer on the scene the day of the
accident offered testimony at the trial. Officer Brown stated that according to his
report of the accident, Mr. Fredrickson's vehicle was traveling too close and too
fast and wasn't able to stop in time, and acknowledged the presence of a flagger
on the scene. Transcript I at p. 35.
Ms. Mann claimed to have suffered severe physical injuries as a result of
the subject accident, ultimately requiring extensive back surgery. As a result of
the accident and her injuries, Ms. Mann filed the underlying action against the
Appellees.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and her motion for a new trial as there was no
evidence to support the finding that Ms. Mann had any liability for the accident
much less 100% of the liability as concluded by the jury. The trial court erred in
its reliance upon partial unrelated and contradictory facts as the sole basis for
denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. In addition, the trial court erred in the
giving of Jury Instruction No. 28, as it was confusing and misleading to the jury,
and was not supported by sufficient evidence.

6

DISCUSSION
L

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE JURY'S VERDICT

The record below is free from any evidence that would support a verdict
apportioning 100% of the liability of the subject accident to the Appellant. The
verdict rendered by the jury was entirely inconsistent with the law and with the
evidence presented at trial, and the decisions of the trial court should accordingly
be reversed.
When considering a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, an appellate court will "reverse [the
trial court's decision] only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict."
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). To demonstrate
that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the party challenging
the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict. Crookston 817 P.2d at 799.
To demonstrate the lack of evidence presented at trial in support of the
jury's verdict finding the Appellant 100% at fault for the subject accident, the
relevant facts, marshaled in favor of the verdict, are as follows:
a. All parties testified that the accident occurred in a construction zone.
Transcript I at 17, Transcript II at 14.
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b. Appellant could not give an estimate of the impact speed of the accident.
Transcript I at 74.
c. Appellant testified that there was a flagger on the road who instructed
her to stop, so she stopped. Transcript I at p. 18.
d. Appellant testified that she made a normal stop, and was stopped for ten
to fifteen seconds before her vehicle was struck from behind by the truck driven
by Mr. Fredrickson. Transcript I at p. 19.
e. Appellee Fredrickson testified that the accident occurred in a
construction zone. Transcript II at p. 14.
f. Appellee Fredrickson testified that he followed the Appellant's vehicle
for a short period of time, and she suddenly stopped in the middle of the road, and
he didn't have enough time to stop - he tried to stop, slammed on his brakes, but
his truck began to fishtail and he struck the back of the Appellant's car at an
angle. Transcript II at p. 15.
g. Appellee Fredrickson's statement at the scene of the accident stated,
"Following car, I noticed she stopped quickly, not enough time for our big truck
to stop." Transcript II at p. 17.
h. Appellee Fredrickson testified that at the time of the accident he was
very surprised that Appellant stopped suddenly, and he didn't see any reason why
she should have. Id.
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i. Appellee Fredrickson testified that after the accident, once he got out of
the truck, he first noticed a flagger standing approximately twenty feet from the
scene of the accident. Transcript II at p. 19.
j . Excerpts of Appellee Fredrickson's deposition were read and discussed.
Appellee explained that he had testified that "there was nothing [Ms. Mann] could
have done to avoid the accident" because he was assuming there was confusion on
the part of the flagger, as he didn't see any reason why she would have had to stop
suddenly. Transcript II at p.33.
k. Officer Matt Brown was the responding officer who performed the
investigation on the scene of the accident, and testified that the accident occurred
in the middle of the road. Transcript I at pp. 34, 41.
1. Officer Brown's report stated that Appellee Fredrickson's vehicle was
traveling too close and too fast and wasn't able to stop in time. Transcript I at p.
35.
m. Officer Brown testified that according to his recollection there was no
involvement of a flagger other than requesting vehicles to stop. Id.
n. The court took judicial notice of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69(2), a statute
which Officer Brown was unaware of, which concerns sudden stops. Transcript I
at 43.
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1. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's post-trial motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial,
Utah courts have held that "[i]n most cases where one car "rear-ends"
another, it accords with common sense and experience to believe that the
following car has disregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead and to keep the car
under control, and is, therefore, at fault." Anderson v. Sharp, 899 P.2d 1245, 1247
(Utah App. 1995). While under Utah law there is no formal "rear-end
presumption" as in other jurisdictions1, Anderson indicates that Utah recognizes a
common sense "rear-end presumption" of negligence. This notion arises from a
duty codified under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-62(1) (2002), which provides:
"(1) The operator of a vehicle:
(a) may not follow another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent, having regard for the:
(i) speed of the vehicles;
(ii) traffic upon the highway; and
(iii) condition of the highway; and
(b) shall allow sufficient space in front of the vehicle to enable
any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space."
As discussed above, the application of this statute to a rear-end collision
creates a rebuttable common-sense presumption that the driver of the following
1

Other states interpret their statutes requiring a following driver to maintain a
proper lookout as creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence to the following
driver in a rear-end collision. Some of these states include Florida, Louisiana, New
York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, Colorado. See generally
Cleaveland v. Florida Power and Light, Inc., 895 So.2d 1143 (Fla. App. 4 Dist.
2005); Charrier v. Primm, 909 So.2d 1033 (La. App. 2 Or. 2005); Russ v.
Investech Sec., 6 A.D.3d 602, 775 N.Y.S. 2d 867 (N.Y.A.D. 2004); DiLoreto v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 243, 418 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1981); Reed v.
Breton, 264 Mich. App. 363, 691 N.W.2d 779 (Mich. App. 2004); Plourde v.
Myers, 823 A.2d 1138 (R.L 2003); Bettnerv. Boring, 764P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988).
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vehicle violated the duty created by §41-6-62(1). This "common sense
presumption" can be overcome; however, a verdict related to liability that is
entirely adverse to the leading car and attributes no negligence to the following car
must be supported by sufficient evidence. A jury's disregard of this commonsense notion, and allocation of 100% of the fault in a rear-end accident to the
leading driver would accordingly require a substantial amount of objective
evidence indicating wrongdoing on the part of the leading driver or completely
exonerating the following driver.
The Utah Supreme Court has considered a case with similar facts as the
present case. In King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987), the plaintiff and
defendant were involved in a low speed rear end collision. King 739 P.2d at 620.
At trial the jury in King rendered a verdict for the defendant (following car) and
the plaintiff brought a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court
and upheld by the Supreme Court. The reasoning for sustaining the verdict in
King was the existence of specific evidence in favor or the verdict. The Supreme
Court pointed to detailed evidence that supported the verdict for the defense.
First, the plaintiff in King testified that the impact was not significant enough to
move her vehicle. Id. In addition, plaintiff testified that she abruptly "hit her
brakes to avoid hitting the car in front of her" and that she had told the
investigating officer not to give the defendant a citation because the traffic was so
bad that "we could have all hit each other." King at 621. The facts in King set
forth at least some basis for justifying a verdict in favor of the defendant, as even
11

the plaintiff in that matter presented objective facts which could reasonably tend to
exonerate the defendant.
In the instant case, there was no evidence presented which would
demonstrate the required substantial wrongdoing on the part of Ms. Mann as
indicated by the jury; and further, there was no evidence that would completely
exonerate Mr. Fredrickson - to the contrary, Mr. Fredrickson's own testimony
clearly indicates that he had some degree of fault in causing the accident. Mr.
Fredrickson testified to the following objective facts indicating he had a
significant degree of liability in causing the accident:
a. There was "nothing [Ms. Mann] could have done to avoid the accident.
Transcript II at pp. 31, 33.
b. [Ms. Mann] stopped quickly, not enough time to stop my big truck.
Transcript II at p. 17.
c. Mr. Fredrickson testified that after seeing Appellant stop suddenly, he
slammed on his brakes, causing his truck to fishtail, ultimately striking her
vehicle. Transcript II at p. 16.
d. Mr. Fredrickson did not see the flagger controlling traffic until after the
accident occurred, and he had exited his vehicle. Transcript II at pp. 19, 27.
e. Mr. Fredrickson testified that he didn't see any reason why Ms. Mann
would have stopped her vehicle. Transcript II at pp. 17, 33.
Adopting Mr. Fredrickson's version of the facts as true, there remains
absolutely no evidence that would reasonably point to the Appellant as being
12

100% negligent, as apportioned by the jury, and likewise no evidence to justify a
conclusion of zero negligence by the jury with respect to Mr. Fredrickson. His
testimony establishing that he "did not have enough time to stop his big truck"
coupled with his agreement that there was "nothing [the Appellant] could have
done to avoid the accident" demonstrate that a verdict apportioning zero liability
to the Appellee is unreasonable and unjust.
In support of his allegations of Ms. Mann's negligence, Mr. Fredrickson
pointed to his contention that the plaintiff negligently slammed on her brakes, not
giving him enough time to stop his truck. In furtherance of this contention he
caused the court to take judicial notice of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-69(2),
which states:
"A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without
first giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately
to the rear when there is an opportunity to give a signal" (emphasis added).
Even construed liberally, this statute does not create a generalized duty for
drivers to not "stop suddenly" as asserted below by the Appellees; and this statute
certainly does not diminish the general duty of following drivers to maintain a
proper lookout and allow enough distance to safely control their vehicle.
Specifically, what this statute does do is to create a limited duty applicable in
limited circumstances. According to the actual language of the statute, a leading
vehicle, when coming to a stop, has a duty to signal a following vehicle only when
there is an opportunity to give a signal. The verdict rendered by the jury, finding
Ms. Mann entirely at fault, reflects a negligent violation of this duty Ms. Mann
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presumably owed to the defendant, a contention wholly unsupported by the
evidence.
The defendant introduced absolutely no evidence at trial about the
opportunity, if any, Ms. Mann had to give an appropriate signal, but only that she
stopped too quickly to give him enough time to stop his big furniture truck. Not
only was there no evidence offered to support Ms. Mann's failure to give a signal,
but Mr. Fredrickson's own testimony conflicted with this assertion, as he agreed
that "there was nothing Ms. Mann could have done to have avoided the accident."
Transcript II at pp. 31, 33.
Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
there is insufficient evidentiary basis for the finding of any negligence on the part
of Ms. Mann, much less the 100% represented by the verdict. In fact, the evidence
presented at trial was completely contrary to the verdict rendered by the jury. The
inconsistent verdict is plainly unreasonable and contrary to justice. The verdict is
the result of the jury's disregard and misapplication of facts in evidence and the
consideration of unknown facts or assertions, which were outside the evidence
presented at trial. As such, the court should reverse the determination of the
district court and order a new trial based on the grounds discussed herein.
2. The trial court erred in relying on partial, remote and inconsistent
facts considered in isolation as the sole basis for upholding the
verdict
In making the ruling below, the trial court combined portions of
contradicting testimony given by the opposing parties, and used excerpts of each
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to uphold the verdict. As set forth above, Ms. Mann claimed to have entered the
construction zone, to have seen the flagger, and to have slowed to a controlled stop
where she sat for 10-15 seconds before being struck by Mr. Fredrickson's vehicle.
Mr. Fredrickson testified that he did not see the flagger until after the accident, but
that the accident occurred because Ms. Mann slammed on her brakes for some
unknown reason, not allowing him enough time to stop his vehicle.
When considering a challenge to a jury verdict, a court of appeals in Utah "will
upset a jury verdict only upon a showing that the evidence so clearly
preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on
the outcome of the case." Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213,
1216 (Utah App. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1982) (stating that an
appellate court should uphold jury verdict unless jury's finding is " 'so plainly
unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably
could make [such a] finding1 "(citation omitted)).
The jury's verdict in this case was plainly unreasonable. At the hearing on
the motion for a new trial, the trial court presented as a "reasonable basis" for the
verdict, the excerpt of Ms. Mann's testimony that she saw the flagger 10-15
seconds before the accident occurred together with Mr. Fredrickson's contention
that Ms. Mann suddenly slammed on her brakes. September 23, 2005 Oral
Argument ("Transcript III") at pp. 1-2. The court combined these two partial
pieces of testimony to propose that the jury could have concluded that Ms. Mann
15

was telling the truth only about seeing the flagger 10-15 seconds beforehand, but
adopting Mr. Fredrickson's testimony that she took no action until the last minute,
slamming on her brakes and causing the accident. Transcript DI at p. 2.
Appellant contends that the pragmatic piecing together of contradicting
testimony examined out of context and in isolation, in order to salvage a jury
verdict demonstrates the unreasonableness of the verdict and satisfies the standard
which would warrant reversal of the trial court's determination. When pressed by
counsel, as to whether the court's proposed scenario would justify the 100%
negligence apportioned by the verdict, the court responded, "Sure, under that
circumstance. Then we're just talking about was it 90, 80, 100." Transcript HI at p.
3. The vacillation by the court in answering this question conclusively and
decisively, indicates that there may have been some indication of
unreasonableness in the verdict. Worth noting as well, is that the scenario adopted
by the court in support of the verdict was created and fashioned entirely by the
court and was not proposed by Appellees' counsel at any stage of the proceeding.
The court noted that Appellant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was denied by the previous trial judge, but did not dispute counsel's
assertion that no real basis or reasoning was given for that decision. Transcript DI
at p.4.
The dissected scenario proposed and adopted by the trial court as the only
basis for upholding the verdict is plainly unreasonable. Consideration of the
totality of the evidence presented at trial, no reasonable jury could have arrived at
16

such a conclusion. The trial in this matter was a five-day proceeding, focusing
primarily upon medical records and expert testimony surrounding the injuries
sustained by Ms. Mann and the causation of those injuries. The jury's verdict
apportioning 100% of the negligence to Ms. Mann is blatantly inconsistent with
the evidence presented with respect to liability. The trial court's ruling
incorporates a method of picking and choosing portions of two contradictory
statements from a five-day proceeding it was unable to preside over , and piecing
them together in order to salvage an unreasonable and unjust verdict. Should such
an approach be allowed to stand, trial courts would be left with unfettered
discretion to uphold any and all unreasonable and unjust verdicts.
While Appellant concedes it is the exclusive province of the jury, or finder
of fact, to judge the credibility of witnesses, this province is subject to the
limitation that a jury cannot capriciously or arbitrarily reject credible evidence
when there is no sound reason for doing so. See Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins,
All P.2d 132, 135 (Utah 1966) (citing Holland v. Brown, 394 P.2d 77 (Utah
1964)). When a jury acts outside these limitations, it is the duty of the trial court
to ensure a just result. Appellant maintains that the trial court failed to "fulfill [its]
function of maintaining general supervision over litigation to guard against
miscarriages of justice which sometimes occur at the hands of juries." Holland v.

2

The Honorable Deno Himonas, who presided over the hearing on the motion for
a new trial had been recently appointed to the particular district court where this
matter was heard - the Honorable Judge Robert W. Adkins presided over the trial
on this matter.
17

Brown, 394 P.2d 77. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing Appellant
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of her motions.
II.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 28 WAS IMPROPERLY GIVEN,
AS IT WAS CONFUSING, MISLEADING AND NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SERVE AS
DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE CASE.

The trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 28. In addition to the
insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the Appellant, respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the lower court's determinations, and order the district court
to set aside the verdict, vacate the judgment and grant a new trial based on the fact
that Jury Instruction number 28 was misleading, confusing, and unsupported by
the evidence.
To require a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction, it must
be shown that the erroneous instruction "was prejudicial, i.e., that it tend[ed] to
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or
erroneously advise[d] the jury on the law." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000
UT App 239. As Appellant's counsel argued, Instruction 28 was misleading and
confusing to the extent that it was prejudicial to the Ms. Mann; it affected her
substantial rights, was inconsistent with substantial justice, and justified the
granting of a new trial.
The Appellant took timely exception to Instruction 28 at trial for the
aforementioned reasons. Appellant believes that the giving of this instruction
directly contributed to a verdict that was contrary to the evidence offered at trial.
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Instruction number 28 was unsupported by the evidence, and was
confusing and misleading to the jurors, and improperly influenced the jury to the
plaintiffs detriment. It is important to note that during the course of the
proceeding, the court deliberately took special care to limit instructions regarding
outside influences such as the actions or inaction of an "unknown flagger" due to a
complete lack of evidence; accordingly, as there was no evidence of "flagger
negligence," reference to said flagger was properly kept off of the special verdict
form by the court. The instruction in question should have been given similar
treatment. The Appellees had the burden to offer evidence to prove their
allegation of negligence on the part of Ms. Mann. As outlined in the jury
instructions the defendants below had the burden to prove that Ms. Mann (1)
Failed to stop or slow down without observing that it could be done safely, and (2)
Failed to give a proper signal that her vehicle was stopping. Jury Instruction No.
28. The evidence presented by the Appellees, as a matter of law, failed to satisfy
this burden. Review of all trial testimony surrounding liability, construed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates that the evidence offered by
defendants did not warrant Instruction Number 28.
The Appellees introduced at trial Utah Code Annotated §41-6-69(2), upon
which the challenged instruction is based, to illustrate negligence on behalf of the
Ms. Mann. Appellees did not, however, offer any evidence to warrant the
instruction. Thus, the jury was left to speculate and consider facts outside of the
evidence presented to arrive at their verdict.
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The instruction in question consists of multiple elements that create a
duty, which any leading driver would presumably owe to following vehicles.
These elements create a limited rather than generalized duty, one restricted to a set
of circumstances not proven in the present case. One of the essential elements of
the statute and corresponding instruction is the opportunity to give a signal.
Defendants at trial presented no evidence that Ms. Mann had an opportunity to
give a signal. Since no evidence was presented to support this essential element,
the defendants below could not have satisfied their burden with respect to the
statute or corresponding instruction, and thus the instruction was inappropriate and
should not have been given.
The administering of this misleading instruction, which was unsupported
by the evidence was confusing to the jury, was prejudicial to the Appellant, and
resulted in a verdict which was inconsistent with and contrary to the evidence.
Accordingly, the submission to the jury of Instruction 28 was not harmless error
and therefore the Appellant should be granted the relief sought on these grounds.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing grounds, the Appellant respectfully urges this
court to reverse the rulings below, and to issue an order instructing the trial court
to set aside the verdict, vacate the corresponding judgment and grant the
Appellant's motion for a new trial.
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DATED this U_

day of March, 2006.
LAW OFHCES OF WILLIAM R.

William R. Ra
Attorney for Appelant
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Albert W. Gray
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
7351 South Union Park Ave. #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84047
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ADDENDUM A

Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-62 - Following another vehicle —Safe distance —
Exceptions.
(1) The operator of a vehicle:
(a) may not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having
regard for the:
(i) speed of the vehicles;
(ii) traffic upon the highway; and
(iii) condition of the highway; and
(b) shall allow sufficient space in front of the vehicle to enable any other vehicle to enter
and occupy the space.

ADDENDUM B

Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-69 - Turning or changing lanes -Safety -Signals ~
Stopping or sudden decrease in speed —Signal flashing —Where prohibited.
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first
giving an appropriate signal to the operator of any vehicle immediately to the rear when
there is opportunity to give a signal.

ADDENDUM C
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY* STATE OF UTAH

LOUISE MANN,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,

SAMUEL P. FREDRICKSON, RIDDLE
SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1
THROUGH 10 INCLUSIVE,

Civil No. 030916997
Judge Deno Himonas

Defendants.
Plaintiff's motion for new trial came before this Court for hearing on September 23,
2005.

Plaintiff was represented by counsel, William R. Rawlings.

Defendant was

represented by counsel, Albert W. Gray, Smith & Glausor, P.C. The Court, having read
the memoranda of points and authorities in support of, memorandum of points and
authorities in opposition to, and memoranda of points and authorities in reply to Plaintiff's
motion for new trial, the Court received oral argument from Plaintiff on the matter.

Having reviewed evidence produced in the trial of this matter, having considered the
memoranda in support of and in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for new trial, having heard
the arguments of Plaintiff, the Court now enters this Order:
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for
new trial is denied.
The Court specifically finds that the verdict reached by the jury is supported by
sufficient evidence.
The Court further finds that there was no error in giving of Jury Instruction No. 28
and that there was sufficient evidence for Jury Instruction No. 28 to have been given.
DATED this Xk> day of

. 2005.
BY THE COURT:

u

The Honorable Deno Himonas
Third District Court Judge

APPROVED AS m FORM:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 2y,h day of
September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to the following:
William R. Rawlings, Esq.
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS
11576 South State St, #401
Draper, UT 84020
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